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INJUNCTIONS AGAINST MASS PICKETING-
A GAP IN THE PRE-EMPTION DOCTRINE
LAWRENCE M. KEARNS *
Mass picketing and violence in labor disputes are almost uni-
versally condemned. Clark Kerr of the University of California in
referring in 1957 to the problem of violence in labor disputes, made
these comments:
Violence also is to be condemned. It has decreased greatly
as a union tactic, however, and is subject to control by the
many devices civilized man has created to insure law and
order. 1
Two such devices are (1) the enforcement of local criminal laws by
the police and (2) the issuance of injunctions by the courts. Under-
standably, therefore, consternation was created among Massachusetts
employers in 1960, when a lower court denied an injunction against
mass picketing in the Bethlehem case,2 although the police were unable
to cope with the situation.
The reason for the denial of the injunction was the court's inter-
pretation of a statutory provision requiring an employer to make every
reasonable effort to settle the labor dispute by negotiation or arbi-
tration as a condition precedent to injunctive relief. Similarly, in the
subsequent General Electric case' in Massachusetts the employer's
conduct relative to the settlement of the dispute was held to bar
issuance of an injunction against mass picketing. A bill filed with
the 1961 Massachusetts legislature to remedy the effect of these
decisions failed of passage by a tie vote. 4 The vital question that is
raised is whether it is sound public policy to have the state court's
power to grant or deny injunctive relief against mass picketing and
* A.B. 1935, Holy Cross College; LL.B. 1938, Harvard University; Partner in
the firm of Morgan, Brown, Kearns & Joy, Boston.
1 Kerr, Unions and Union Leaders of Their Own Choosing 6 (Fund for the Re-
public, 1957).
2 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Kehoe, Equity No. 76496, Suffolk Super. Ct. Mass., Feb.
12, 1960.
3 General Electric v. McQueeney, Equity No. 77426, Suffolk Super. Ct. Mass., Oct.
21, 1960.
4 S. 233, Mass. Senate, 1961. This bill would have amended section 9A(4) of Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 214 (1958) by adding at the end thereof the following language:
"except that the requirements of this subsection shall not apply where the basis of the
equitable relief sought is confined to one or more of the following: mass picketing,
violence, physical injury to persons or tangible property, picketing which wrongfully
interferes with peaceful entrance to or egress from private property, or seizure or occupa-
tion of private property."
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violence depend upon the court's evaluation of how the employer
conducted himself in the handling of the labor dispute.
The Bethlehem Steel strike began on January 23, 1960. That
strike was accompanied by mass picketing and violence at the com-
pany's Quincy Yard. The massed pickets physically prevented the
company's executives and supervisory staff, including the General
Manager, from entering the Quincy Yard. The company promptly
filed a petition with the Massachusetts Superior Court seeking an
order of the court to restrain the union's illegal conduct. In a twelve
page decision handed down by a three judge panel 5 on February 12,
1960, after seven days of hearing and sixteen days after the bill in
equity was filed, the requested relief was denied.
In its decision, the court stated:
Commencing on January 23, 1960, and continuously there-
after to the present, the respondents, members of Local No. 5,
have, without right and in violation of law; established and
maintained a system of mass picketing at the entrances to
the Quincy Yard and to the Main Office Building whereby
Company employees who have no labor dispute with the
Company, and other persons doing business with the Com-
pany, have been prevented from entering the Yard and Main
Office Building without the consent of the Union.
In order to secure relief, the Company must prove certain
facts required by G.L. (Ter. Ed.), ch. 214, § 9A. We find
that the Company has abundantly proved that unlawful acts
have been committed by the respondents and that further
unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed
by the respondents unless restrained; that substantial and
irreparable injury to the Company's property will follow;
that, as to each item of relief granted, greater injury will be
inflicted upon the Company by denial of relief than will be
inflicted upon the respondents by granting relief ; and that
the Company has no adequate remedy at law. The public
officers charged with the duty of protecting the Company's
property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate pro-
tection.
Although the conduct of the respondents is lawless, unlawful
and in some instances criminal, the Court is powerless to
grant a temporary restraining order or injunctive relief
unless the Company has complied with the provisions of
G.L. (Ter. Ed.), ch. 214, § 9A(4).
6
 A Massachusetts statute enacted in 1959 requires the assignment of three judges
to hear any case involving a labor dispute. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 212, 30 (Supp.
1961) (Acts 1959 ch. 600).
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Section 9A(4), to which the court was referring, provides as
follows:
No restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted
to any complainant who has failed to comply with any
obligation imposed by law which is involved in the labor
dispute in question, or who has failed to make every reason-
able effort to settle such dispute either by negotiation or
with the aid of any available governmental machinery of
mediation or voluntary arbitration.°
The opinion of the court then reviews at length, and in detail, the
course of the negotiations between the company and the union and
concluded that "the Company failed to make every reasonable effort
in good faith to settle the dispute" in these respects:
1. The company unilaterally posted certain notices relating
to conditions of employment during the negotiations. These
notices were posted after the collective bargaining agreement
had expired. The company continued certain conditions of
employment as provided in the expired agreement, changed
some conditions in line with its proposals for a new agreement
and announced that certain provisions of the expired agree-
ment (such as union security, check-off and arbitration)
would not be in effect until there was a new agreement with
the union.
2. The company's proposals for a new agreement would
place the company "in a substantially better competitive
position than any other shipbuilder on the east coast."
The opinion further stated that "the Company refused to make any
concessions with respect to its proposals."
The court also found that the union had proposed arbitration
and "this was rejected categorically." But, having found that the
company had negotiated with the union and that the parties had
met with state and federal conciliators, the court was faced with the
question whether the requirements of negotiation or conciliation or
arbitration in section 9A(4) were alternative or additive, namely
whether the statutory conditions were met if any one of the three
methods were employed or whether all three must be satisfied. The
court held that the requirements were additive, that is, that every
reasonable effort must be made to settle the dispute by all three
methods mentioned in the statute.
The opinion of the court then concludes with these paragraphs:
6
 Mass. Gen, Laws Ann. ch. 214, § 9A(4) (1958), originally enacted as Acts 1935 ch.
407.
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We find that, negotiation and mediation having reached an
impasse, the Company failed to make every reasonable effort
to settle the dispute with the aid of available governmental
machinery for voluntary arbitration. This is fatal to its case,
even in this situation where not only unlawful but criminal
acts have been committed and will continue to be committed,
causing irreparable loss to the Company. In consequence of
the provisions of ch. 214, sec. 9A(4) of the General Laws,
above quoted, the Court is helpless to prevent such criminal
and illegal acts.
Except for the failure on the part of the Company to comply
with the provisions of said section (4), temporary restraining
orders would be granted against all the respondents. The
other necessary facts have been proved. In not granting a
temporary restraining order, the Court does not condone the
conduct of the respondents. However, the applicable statute
enacted by the Legislature makes certain requirements a
condition precedent to the granting of relief that cannot
be disregarded, no matter how compelling the other facts
are.
On March 10, 1960, the court handed down a second decision
denying the application for a preliminary injunction and set forth
these statements in its second opinion:
At the hearing on the application for a restraining order we
did not rule, and do not now rule that the refusal of the
Bethlehem Steel Company to recede from any of its original
proposals•or to make any concessions or to compromise any
of its proposals constituted a failure to make every reasonable
effort to settle the dispute by negotiation. The law, how-
ever, by virtue of General Laws (Ter. Ed.), ch. 214, § 9A(4),
does require that a person seeking a restraining order or
injunctive relief must make every reasonable effort to settle
the dispute by negotiation. We previously ruled, and Nye now
again rule, that this requires negotiation in good faith and
that failure so to negotiate bars the granting of injunctive
relief.
We did not rule at the previous hearing, and do not now rule,
that section 9A(4) requires a person seeking a restraining
order or injunctive relief to submit the dispute to arbitration.
We did rule, and now again rule, that the requirements of
section 9A are additive and not alternative. The law, while
not requiring a person seeking injunctive relief to submit
the dispute to arbitration, does require such person to make
every reasonable effort to settle the dispute with the aid of
160
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available governmental machinery for voluntary arbitration.
This means, and we rule, that such person must in good faith
discuss, and consider the likelihood of settling the dispute by
this means. The Bethlehem Steel Company categorically
rejected the proposals of Locals 5, 90 and 151 to arbitrate.
We ruled previously, and now again rule, that the refusal of
the Company to discuss, or to consider for discussion, any
proposal for arbitration is fatal and bars injunctive relief
in consequence of the provisions of section 9A(4).
An appeal of the court's ruling was subsequently dismissed on
the ground the case had become moot because of a settlement of
the strike.
After the denial of relief by the Massachusetts Superior Court,
the company filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board
alleging that the mass picketing and violence were unfair labor prac-
tices under Section 8(b) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act.'
The union had also filed charges with the Board alleging that the
company's conduct constituted an unfair labor practice of refusal
to bargain collectively in good faith under Section 8(a) (5) of the
National Labor Relations Act. 8
In an unprecedented action, the General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board, in an exercise of discretionary authority under
the act, applied for, and obtained from, the federal District Court
for Massachusetts injunctions restraining the union from engaging
in mass picketing and violence and enjoining the company from re-
fusing to bargain collectively as required by federal statute.'
The company's National Labor Relations Board case against the
union was then heard by a trial examiner who upheld the company's
charges. Subsequently, the National Labor Relations Board handed
7 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947),
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1958).
8 Id. at § 158(a)(5).
9 Alpert v. Bethlehem Steel Co., Civil No. 60-217-S, D. Mass.
Under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935),
as reenacted, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as last amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1958),
the NLRB has discretionary authority to seek injunctive relief against unfair labor
practices after a Board complaint issues and pending its hearing and determination
of the Board's complaint. Except where the Board is required to seek an immediate
injunction, as in secondary boycott cases (§ 8(b)(4) cases) (49 Stat. 452 (1935), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1958)) the Board usually proceeds with its hearing and
disposition of the case, and then proceeds in the United States Court of Appeals for
enforcement of its order if the party does not comply with its order. Reliance upon
the Board's discretionary authority to obtain federal court relief to remedy the unfair
labor practice of mass picketing under § 8(b) (1) (49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(1) (1958)) would not be a sure or prompt remedy in the light
of the Board's reluctance to exercise its discretionary authority and the fact that all
such cases are handled primarily by the Board's Washington office with the assistance
of the regional office.
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down its decision and order adopting the trial examiner's report and
holding the union's mass picketing and violence to have been illega1. 10
The union's National Labor Relations Board charges of bad
faith bargaining against the company were heard by another trial
examiner. He found that, except for one point, the company had not
failed to bargain collectively in good faith under the federal act. The
one point, which he held to constitute a violation of the statutory duty
to bargain, was the provision in the company's proposed agreement
which would have required grievances to be signed by the individual
employees raising them. This point was not even mentioned by the
three judge Massachusetts court.
On October 25, 1961, the Board handed down its decision" sus-
taining in full the trial examiner's recommendations. All five Board
members participated in the decision and they unanimously held,
contrary to the three judges in Massachusetts, that the employer's
conduct did not constitute bad faith bargaining except for the one
point mentioned by the trial examiner and on which the Massachusetts
judges did not comment.
The three judge panel of the Massachusetts court based its
decision as to the requirement for arbitration being additive rather
than alternative on these three grounds:
1. A decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
in the Toledo easel' which so interpreted the parallel pro-
vision of the Norris-LaGuardia Act" in a case where the
Railway Labor Act 14
 was involved. The Massachusetts
three judge court stated that the Toledo case "is controlling
in this instant case and we are bound by it." It may be noted
that this conclusion is debatable."
Locals 5 and 90, Industrial Union of Marine Workers, AFL-CIO, and Bethle-
hem Steel Co., 130 N.L.R.B. No. 39, 47 L.R.R.M. 1297 (Feb. 17, 1961).
Bethlehem Steel Co. and Local 151, American Federation of Technical Engineers,
AFL-CIO, 133 N.L.R.B. No. 136, 49 L.R.R.M. 1018 (October 25, 1961) ; Bethlehem
Steel Co. and Industrial Union of Marine Workers, AFL-CIO, 133 N.L.R.B. No. 138,
49 L.R.R.M. 1016 (October 25, 1961).
12 Enterprise Lodge No. 27 v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R., 321 U.S. 50 (1944).
13
 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. $$ 101-15 (1958).
14 44 Stat. .577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63, 181-88 (1958).
its The construction of a state statute is a matter for the courts of the state. 50
Am. Jur. Statutes § 323 (1944). Although a decision by the highest federal court con-
struing identical language in a federal statute is obviously persuasive, it still would not
prevent the state court from adopting a different construction. Compare, for example,
Colonial Press, Inc. v. Ellis, 321 Mass. 495, 74 N.E.2d 1, 20 L.R.R.M. 237 (1947), in
which the Supreme Judicial Court declined to accept at face value the United States
Supreme Court's earlier statements that peaceful picketing was constitutionally protected
free speech, a doctrine subsequently modified by the latter court. Furthermore, the
Toledo case was decided in 1944, and the pre
-emption doctrine in the Garman case was
amended in 1950. In addition, there is a strong factual distinction between a railroad's
refusal to use Railway Labor Act procedures and an ordinary employer's refusal to
arbitrate.
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2. "Significant intimations" in two decisions of the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court.' Whether such "inti-
mations" are "significant", as stated by the court, is open to
question.17
3. The provision of the Cox-Phillips Act 18
 that the Massa-
chusetts anti-injunction act is to be "construed liberally in
aid of its purpose which is to limit and curtail the use of
injunctions in labor disputes." But it may be answered
that the main concern of the Cox-Phillips Act was to liber-
alize the lawful objectives of peaceful strikes and peaceful
picketing and to add provisions for notice before obtaining a
temporary restraining order. Nothing in that act was de-
18
 Davis Bros. Fisheries Co. v. Pimental, 322 Mass. 499, 508, 78 N.E.2d 93, 98
(1948); Thayer Co. v. Binnal, 326 Mass. 467, 479, 95 N.E.2d 193, 201 (1950).
17 In both the Davis and Thayer cases, the lower court judge found that there
had been compliance by the petitioner-employer with all the pre-requisites for injunctive
relief under § 9, including the provisions of § 9A(4). In both cases, injunctions were
granted and the action of the trial court was sustained.
In the Davis case the Supreme Judicial Court stated: "We assume in favor of the
defendants, without decision, that there must be a reasonable effort to settle the dispute
by all of the methods mentioned and not merely by one of them." 322 Mass. at 508, 78
N.E.2d at 98. (Emphasis supplied.) (Citing the Toledo case.) The court then goes
on to state that the judge's finding that the plaintiff "has made every reasonable effort
to settle . . . [the] dispute", satisfied the requirements of the statute and was not plainly
wrong. There is nothing in the opinion to indicate, one way or the other, whether the
employer expressed a willingness to arbitrate. The basic labor dispute involved a ques-
tion of representation; the grounds for granting the injunction were that the strike was
for a closed shop. The court also stated: "There is no evidence that the picketing at any
time was other than peaceful, or that the number of pickets employed was excessive."
Id. at 504, 78 N.E.2d at 96.
In the Thayer case, the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court states: "But not-
withstanding the defendant's contention to the contrary, the sum total of all the findings
set forth above is that the judge, before entering final decrees, made findings sufficient
to demonstrate that there was compliance with Section 9A. In this respect, we are
of the opinion that the findings that the plaintiffs have not failed to comply with any
obligation imposed upon them by law and that they have made every reasonable effort
to settle these disputes by negotiation and 'with the aid of available governmental ma-
chinery'—which, we think, includes that adapted for mediation and arbitration—
show that the plaintiffs are not barred from relief by (4) of Sec. 9A." 326 Mass. at 479,
95 N.E.2d at 201. The opinion also contains this language: "He further ruled that the
plaintiffs were not required to seek any remedy, administrative or otherwise, before
bringing these suits. He found, however, that the plaintiffs had appeared before the
State board of conciliation and arbitration but that efforts to settle the controversy
failed because of defendants' insistence that the Local be recognized as the collective
bargaining agent." Id. at 477, 95 N.E.2d at 200. (Emphasis supplied.)
The most interesting sidelight of the Thayer case is that there was an NLRB
case pending at the same time. The Board found the company had committed unfair
labor practices, H. N. Thayer Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1122, June 30, 1952, enforced, N.L.R.B.
v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 34 L.R.R.M. 2250 (1st Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
883 (1954). Thus, as it ultimately turned out, the judge of the lower Massachusetts
court was wrong in his finding that the company had not failed to comply with any
obligations imposed upon them by law—if § 9A(4) means that all the requirements of
the National Labor Relations Act are embraced within the legal obligation referred to
in § 9A(4) as the judges in the Massachusetts General Electric case ruled.
18
 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 214, § 9A (1958).
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signed to favor the use of mass picketing and violence in
labor disputes.
A strike of the employees of General Electric Company at its
plants at Lynn, West Lynn, and Everett, Massachusetts, a bargaining
unit containing approximately 10,700 employees, commenced on
October 2, 1960. On October 5, 1960, the company filed a bill of
complaint in the Massachusetts Superior Court seeking to restrain
alleged violence on the picket line, mass picketing and injury to
persons and property. 19 Hearings began before a three judge panel
on October 6 and continued for over a week. On October 21, 1960,
sixteen days after the petition for immediate relief was sought from
the court, a three judge panel issued an eleven page decision denying
the applicaton for a temporary restraining order on the grounds the
company had failed to comply with section 9A(4).
The three judge panel concluded that the company had failed
to make every reasonable effort to settle the dispute because:
1. "There is no sufficient reason for the Company's refusal"
to accept the proposal of the federal conciliators to continue
bargaining with the assistance of a panel of mediators while
maintaining the status quo.
2. "There is no sufficient reason for the Company's refusal"
to accept the union's request for a fifteen day extension
of the expiring collective bargaining agreement.
3. "There are no sufficient reasons for the refusal of the
Company to accept" the union's offer to submit the dispute
to fact finding or arbitration.
The judges also found that the company had failed to comply
with the obligation imposed upon it by law in that it violated its duty
to bargain collectively with the IUE negotiating committee by dealing
directly with an IUE local business agent at its Schenectady, New
York plant.
The G. E. strike ended before any appeal could be taken. Thus,
there is no decision of the Supreme Judicial Court on the correctness
of the interpretation and application of section 9A(4) in either the
Bethlehem or General Electric cases.
What is the situation with respect to comparable statutory
restrictions in other states? First of all, there are no anti-injunction
acts in twenty-seven states. In the twenty-three states (including
Massachusetts) having some statutory conditions specifically relating
to the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes, the statutory pro-
visions in ten of such states' contain no provision comparable to
10 See note 3 supra.
20 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1808 (1956) ; III. Ann. Stat. ch. 48,
	 2(a) (Smith-
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section 9A(4) of the Massachusetts statute or Section 8 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. In the anti-injunction act in Pennsylvania, there is a
special statutory exception excluding from the coverage of the statute
cases where the union is seizing, holding, damaging or destroying a plant,
equipment or machinery to compel the employer to accede to its
demands.2 ' Presumably this statutory exception was mainly intended
to permit injunctions against sit-down strikes without complying with
the statutory conditions applicable to injunctions in other types of
labor disputes. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that this
statutory exception removes cases involving mass picketing from the
purview of the anti-injunction act since the words "seize or hold"
property includes prevention of free ingress and egress.'
This leaves eleven states where the statutory provisions are
such that a situation comparable to that in Massachusetts might arise.
These states are: Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland,
New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, and Wisconsin.
The statutory provision in each of the above-noted eleven states is
identical with section 9A(4) of the Massachusetts statute and Sec-
tion 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act except in Rhode Island, Con-
necticut, and Wisconsin. 23
In the Rhode Island statute24 the comparable section reads exactly
Hurd 1952) ; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-1104 to 60-1107 (1949); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
ch. 107, § 36 (1954); Minn. Stat. §§ 185.01 to 185.20 (1957)—this is an old "Little
Norris-LaGuardia Act" and may he modified by later legislation; N.Y. Stat. Ann. §§ 59-
2-1 to 59-2-2 (1953)—this is a modified type of "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" which
requires a hearing and showing of irreparable injuries before granting an injunction;
N.D. Rev. Code §§ 34-0801 to 34-0813 (1943); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, § 166 (1954) ;
Wash. Rev. Code §§ 49.32.010 to 49.32.910 (1956); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-239 to 27-245
(1957).
21
 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 206d(d) (1957). This section relieves an employer from
meeting the requirements of the anti-injunction law as follows:
Where in the course of a labor dispute as herein defined, an employee, or em-
ployees acting in concert, or a labor organization, or the members, officers,
agents, or representatives of a labor organization or anyone acting for such
organization, seize, hold, damage, or destroy the plant, equipment or machinery,
or other property of the employer with the intention of compelling the employer
to accede to any demands, conditions, or terms of employment, or for collective
bargaining. •
22 Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 353 Pa. 420, 45 A.2d 853
(1946) ; Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. United Electrical Workers, 383 Pa. 297, 118
A.2d 180 (1955).
23 Idaho Code Ann. § 44-707 (1948); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 40-508 (1952); La. Rev.
Stat. § 23.845 (1950) ; Md. Ann. Code art. 100, § 69 (1957); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:
15-54 (1952) ; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 876-a(4); Ore, Rev. Stat. § 662.100 (1959); Utah
Code Ann. § 34-1-29 (1953).
24 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 28-10-4 (1956):
No relief shall be granted to any complainant who has failed to comply with
an obligation imposed by law which is involved in the labor dispute in question,
and who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either
by negotiation and with the aid of any available governmental machinery of
mediation or voluntary arbitration when imposed by contract or by law.
(Emphasis supplied.)
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the same as section 9A(4) except for the addition of the following
seven words: "when imposed by law or by contract." With the
addition of these words, it seems clear that even arbitrary refusal
of an employer to arbitrate would not preclude injunctive relief against
mass picketing and violence. Under the language of the Rhode Island
statute the company's compliance with the condition precedent to
obtaining injunctive relief, so far as having resorted to voluntary
arbitration is concerned, would be confined to a showing that it had
not declined to use voluntary arbitration if required by contract or
law. There is no federal Iaw requiring arbitration and no law of the
state of Rhode Island requiring it. So far as contractual arbitration
is concerned, such requirement would exist during the term of an
agreement where there is a grievance arbitration provision in the agree-
ment. The typical situation, however, where mass picketing and
violence would be involved in a labor dispute would be after termi-
nation of the contract and in respect to the union's demands for a
new contract. Thus, while the Rhode Island statute would cause a
different result from that in Massachusetts as interpreted by the
three judge courts on the point of prior willingness to submit to
arbitration, there would still exist under the Rhode Island statute
the question of interpreting what the preliminary requirement of the
employer is, for complying with "an obligation imposed by law which
is involved in the labor dispute in question", as well as what reasonable
efforts must be made to settle the dispute by negotiation and whether
the requirements of negotiation, conciliation, and arbitration are alter-
native or additive. There are no reported decisions in Rhode Island
involving this particular section of its statute.
The Connecticut statutory provision is an unusual one and
provides that "no temporary injunction shall be made permanent
unless the plaintiff shall allege and prove . . . willingness to submit
such labor dispute to arbitration or mediation." 25
 Presumably, tem-
porary injunctive relief may be obtained without alleging and proving
willingness to submit the labor dispute to arbitration and mediation
and it is only when the employer seeks to make the temporary in-
junction permanent that he must make such proof. A lower court in
Connecticut has held the requirements of "arbitration or mediation"
to be additive rather than alternative," but there appears to be no
decision by the highest court in Connecticut on the point.
Wisconsin's anti-injunction Iaw contains a section comparable
to section 9A(4) of the Massachusetts act," but the practical situ-
25 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 31-117 (1958).
26
 Landers, Frary & Clark v. Local 207, United Electrical Workers, 19 Conn. Supp.
402, 115 A.2d 464 (Super. Ct. 1955).
27 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 103.57 (1957). This section is similar to § 9A(4) of the
Massachusetts act except that the following language is added at the end of the Wis-
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ation in Wisconsin is materially affected by the Wisconsin Labor Rela-
lations Aces which gives authority to the Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board to enjoin mass picketing and violence. Under such
procedure the employer himself may not go directly to the court for
equitable relief but files his charge with the board which, if investi-
gation sustains the charge, proceeds to issue an order restraining the
unlawful conduct. The order is enforceable by the Wisconsin courts.
In the well-publicized Kohler strike, the Wisconsin board restrained
mass picketing and violence and its order was upheld by the Wisconsin
courts and the Supreme Court of the United States.' The procedure
in Wisconsin is comparable to that under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act where the National Labor Relations Board may find mass
picketing and violence to be an unfair labor practice under sec-
tion 8(b) (1) of the act and may obtain an injunction in the federal
court. Since the state board action is confined to mass picketing and
violence, the action is not pre-empted by the federal act, so that the
situation is one of concurrent jurisdiction. The National Labor Rela-
tions Board, however, has rarely used its discretionary authority to
seek preliminary injunctive relief in the federal courts and enforce-
ment of a Board order by the Court of Appeals after Board hearings
would be obviously so delayed in time as to be of little practical value
to an employer at the time the mass picketing and violence occurs."
Wisconsin is the only state to have handled the problem of mass
picketing and violence through unfair labor practice proceedings of
a state board.'
In New Jersey, where the anti-injunction act contains a section
identical to section 9A(4),' 2
 the lower courts have held (contrary
to the Bethlehem and G. E. decisions in Massachusetts) that the section
requires no more than a reasonable effort to settle the labor dispute
by any one of the three alternative methods of negotiation, concili-
ation or arbitration." As in Massachusetts, there is no decision by the
highest court of New Jersey on this point.
Surprisingly enough, although the New York anti-injunction law
consin section: ". . but the court shall not be required to await the action of any
such tribunal if irreparable injury is threatened."
28 Wis. Stat. Ann. §§, 111.01 to 111.19 (1957).
29 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
80 See note 9 supra.
31 The Massachusetts Labor Relations Act (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 150A,
§ 1-12 (1958)) provides for several union unfair labor practices, including engaging in a
sit-down strike (§§ 4A and 4B), but none covering mass picketing and violence.
32 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A 15-54 (1952).
33
 Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp. v. United Electrical Workers, 138 N.J.
Eq. 3, 46 A.2d 453 (1946), aff'd, 139 N.J. Eq. 97, 49 A.2d 896 (1946); Westinghouse
Electric Corp. v. United Electrical Workers, 138 N.J. Eq. 44, 47 A.2d 734 (1946);
Isolantite, Inc. v. United Electrical Workers, 130 N.J. Eq. 506, 22 A.2d 796 (1941),
modified on other grounds, 132 N.J. Eq. 613, 29 A.2d 183 (1942).
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contains a section identical with section 9A(4),34 there does not appear
to have been any reported decision in the New York appellate courts
interpreting its meaning." The New York appellate courts have up-
held injunctions against seizure of property and violence in labor
disputes, but the decisions made no allusion to the "every reasonable
effort to settle" provision."
There are no reported court decisions in the six other states
having a 9A(4) type of statutory provision." Thus, in the twelve
states, including Massachusetts, in which the issue might be raised
under the state anti-injunction statute, there is no decision by the
highest court of any of these states interpreting the provision. In
so far as the lower court decisions are concerned, those cases which
have specifically alluded to the statutory provision in question are
the ones previously referred to and the score is two to one (Massa-
chusetts and Connecticut v. New Jersey) in favor of interpreting the
requirements as additive rather than alternative, the lower New York
courts not having passed on this specific point."
As noted previously, section 9A(4), which was part of the
original Massachusetts Anti-Injunction Act passed in 1935, and which
has since remained unchanged, was taken from a parallel section of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, the federal anti-injunction law enacted in 1932."
The Wagner Act, officially known as the National Labor Relations
Act,4° was not passed until 1935. The latter act created the obligation
upon employers to recognize a union representing a majority of its
employees as exclusive bargaining agent and to bargain with it in good
faith, although the prototype of this legal obligation was contained in
Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. 41
In Massachusetts, at least, section 9A(4) did not raise a serious
problem for employers during the twenty-five years between 1935 and
1960. It was generally considered that the requirements of the section
were met if the employer seeking the injunction alleged generally that
34 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act 876-a(4).
35 A lower New York court has held that a bill seeking injunctive relief under the
New York anti-injunction law is defective if it fails to allege compliance with the
"every reasonable effort to settle" provision. Scafidi v. Debnar, 22 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup.
Ct. 1940). It has also been the opinion of the lower New York court that the language
of this provision be given a common-sense interpretation so as to require only a "rea-
sonable" effort on the part of the employer to comply with its provisions. Grandview
Dairy, Inc. v. O'Leary, 158 Misc. 791, 285 N.Y. Supp. 841 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
36 See, e.g., Hearn Department Stores v. Livingston, 282 App. Div. 480, 125 N.Y.S.2d
187 (1953).
a 7 Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Oregon and Utah.
38 See note 35 supra, The arbitration point was not in issue in either of the New
York lower court cases there cited.
39 Note 13 supra.
49 National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
§1 151-68 (1958).
41 National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
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it had complied with all legal obligations and any one of the three
alternative efforts for settlement. Thus, in the typical case, the bill
in equity alleged that the employer had complied with all obligations
imposed by law and had negotiated with the union with the aid of
the State Board of Conciliation and Arbitration and the Federal Medi-
ation and Conciliation Service. These allegations were usually not
seriously disputed by the union. Injunctions were granted against
unlawful conduct, without allegation or proof that the employer had
offered to arbitrate the dispute. Presumably, the same situation existed
in New York and the other states having a provision identical with
section 9A(4).
It should be noted that the Massachusetts Anti-Injunction Act,
as well as the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the comparable statutes of
the other states containing a section 9A(4) type of provision, also
contains many other detailed provisions governing the issuance of
injunctions in labor disputes. Briefly, these provisions 42 require
notice to the union, the furnishing of a bond by the employer, a
hearing, and findings by the court that:
1. Unlawful acts are being committed or threatened.
2. Substantial and irreparable injury will follow.
3. Greater injury will be inflicted on the employer by denial
of relief than on the union by granting it.
4. There is no adequate remedy at law.
5. The police are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate
protection.
These procedural provisions are entirely independent of sec-
tion 9A(4) and, accordingly, the improvident issuance of injunctions
in labor disputes does not depend upon a continuation of section
9A(4). Even if that section were repealed or modified, the heavy
burden imposed upon a petitioning employer by the other sections
would remain. Furthermore, the substantive grounds upon which
a labor injunction may be based have been narrowed in Massachusetts
by other statutory provisions,' and the doctrine of federal pre-emption
leaves the state courts an extremely narrow area for action in respect
to those employers subject to the National Labor Relations Act. But
this narrow area of permitted jurisdiction expressly includes injunc-
tions against mass picketing and violence.
Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States places the
primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in labor disputes
on the several states. Beginning with Garner v. Local No. 776, Team-
sters Union" in 1953, the Supreme Court has developed the doctrine
42 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 214, Hi 9A(I) to 9A(3) (1958).
43 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 149, § 20C (1958).
44 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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that in the interests of a uniform national labor policy federal labor
legislation has pre-empted the field of labor relations law, thus denying
state courts the judicial power to enjoin strikes and picketing which
are either protected by, or are prohibited under, federal law, if the
company involved is subject to federal jurisdiction as being an em-
ployer whose activities affect interstate commerce. But the Court
carved out a specific exception to this rule in the area of maintaining
law and order in labor disputes. Here the jurisdiction is left to the
states. The Supreme Court stated by way of dictum in the Garner
case:
. . . Nor is this a case of mass picketing, threatening of
employees, obstructing streets and highways, or picketing
homes. We have held that the state may still exercise its his-
toric powers over such traditionally local matters as public
safety and order and the use of streets and highways."
Subsequently, in 1956, in U.A.W. v. Wisconsin Employee Rela-
tions Board," often referred to as the Kohler case, the Supreme Court
was faced with making a direct ruling on the issue and it ruled squarely
in favor of state jurisdiction to enjoin mass picketing and violence.
The Court's opinion stated:
As a general matter we have held that a State may not,
in the furtherance of its public policy, enjoin conduct which
has been made an unfair labor practice under the federal
statutes. . . . But our post Taft-Hartley opinions have made
it clear that this general rule does not take from the States
power to prevent mass picketing, violence, and overt threats
of violence. The dominant interest of the State in preventing
violence and property damage cannot be questioned. It is
a matter of genuine local concern. Nor should the fact that
a union commits a federal unfair labor practice while en-
gaging in violent conduct prevent States from taking steps to
stop the violence. The conclusion has been explicit in the
opinions cited. . . .
The States are the natural guardians of the public against
violence. It is the local communities that suffer most from
the fear and loss occasioned by coercion and destruction.
We would not interpret an act of Congress to leave them
powerless to avert such emergencies without compelling di-
rections to that effect.
We hold that Wisconsin may enjoin the violent union
conduct here involved.47
45 Id. at 488.
45 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
47 351 U.S. at 274-75-
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had foreshadowed
this ruling. In 1950, in Thayer Co. v. Binall,48 Mr. Justice Ronan
spoke for the court in these words:
It is plain from the findings already recited that the meth-
ods adopted by the defendants in conducting these strikes were
illegal . . . . A state has a solemn obligation to suppress acts
of the character described in these findings, which were
committed by the defendants and those acting with them in
order that injuries to its citizens may be prevented, and
property protected, and peace and order restored and main-
tained. It is immaterial in this respect whether or not the
strike involved the operation of a plant affecting interstate
commerce. The duty of policing strikes under the National
Labor Relations Act and also under the Labor Management
Relations Act remains with the states. . . .49
While the exception of violence and mass picketing from the
doctrine of federal pre-emption in the labor relations field is now
well-established, the doctrine of pre-emption itself has been strength-
ened and widely, extended. Indeed, in this doctrine lie the seeds of
a legal solution to the problem of section 9A(4). For it may now
be forceably argued that the requirements of section 9A(4) are inap-
plicable to any employer subject to the National Labor Relations
Act on pre-emption grounds.
Thus, to the extent that the reference in section 9A(4) to com-
plying with any "obligation imposed by law in the labor dispute"
would be deemed to require a finding by the state court that the
employer had or had not committed an unfair labor practice under
the National Labor Relations Act, such finding would be beyond state
courts' jurisdiction under the pre-emption doctrine. Similarly, if the
requirements to settle the dispute by good faith negotiation and con-
ciliation are equated with the employer's obligation to bargain in
good faith under the federal act, the state court would again lack
jurisdiction to make a finding either way. Finally, to the extent that
section 9A(4) would require the employer to do more than is required
by the federal obligation to bargain in good faith, it would fall as
a state requirement in conflict with the federal obligation. Thus, on
the point of a willingness to arbitrate—which is not an obligation
under the National Labor Relations Act—the state would be requiring
a greater obligation upon the employer, as a condition precedent to
exercising a state right available to litigants generally, than that
imposed by federal labor statutes.
Strong support for this position is contained in the recent decision
48 326 Mass. 467, 95 N.E.2d 193 (1950).
49 Id. at 480, 95 N.E.2d at 201.
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of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in General Electric Co. v.
Callahan.50 This case arose out of the same G.E. strike involving
the injunction proceedings previously discussed. Under a Massa-
chusetts statute," the State Board of Conciliation and Arbitration may
hold a hearing to determine who is to blame for the labor dispute.
After the hearing the board may make public its decision as to whom
it has found to be blameworthy. There is no penalty attached, the
proceeding and finding being in the nature of an enlistment of public
opinion.
In the G.E. case, the state board issued notices scheduling a
hearing under this "placing the blame" procedure. G.E. went to
the federal District Court which denied the Company's request for
an injunction to restrain the state board from holding the hearing.
The Court of Appeals reversed. In its decision the court stated:
The obvious statutory purpose [of the state "placing the
blame" procedure] is to coerce agreement by invoking official
action to mold public opinion with respect to a labor dispute
to the end of bringing the pressure of public opinion to bear
to force a settlement. This is quite contrary to the national
policy not to compel agreement but instead only to encourage
voluntary agreements freely arrived at after "good faith"
bargaining between the parties. The conflict between state
and federal policy is obvious."
The reasoning is obviously apt in a section 9A(4) case. If an
employer subject to the National Labor Relations Act does not have
to comply with a state board procedure because the state is forbidden
under the pre-emption doctrine from requiring the employer to engage
in any greater or different obligation than he has under the federal
act, so the state may not prescribe such a requirement as a condition
precedent to the use of the state's judicial processes to obtain relief
available to citizens generally. And, as indicated previously, no
state agency or court has the authority under the pre-emption theory
to make findings either way as to an employer's compliance with its
federal labor relations obligations.
The conflict of rulings between federal and state jurisdictions,
which pre-emption is designed to prevent, is obvious in the Bethlehem
case. The National Labor Relations Board unanimously ruled that
the company's conduct in announcing, after the collective bargaining
agreement expired, that certain provisions would not IA observed—
and placing into effect the proposed contract changes—did not con-
so 294 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1961).
51 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 150, § 3 (1958).
52 Id. at 67.
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stitute bad faith bargaining." Likewise, the Board held that neither
the nature of the company's proposals nor its refusal to make con-
cessions constituted bad faith bargaining. But, the Massachusetts
court had ruled directly to the contrary on these points. Yet the one
point which the board held did constitute a violation of the employer's
federal obligation, namely, its proposal that grievances be signed
individually by the employee involved, was not even commented upon
by the state court. The case serves to emphasize how unsound it
is to have state courts and a federal Board ruling on the same issue,
that is, whether the company bargained in good faith.
There are other reasons, too, why section 9A(4) should be
inapplicable, particularly in cases involving mass picketing and
violence. Whatever its original merit, changed conditions make it
presently unnecessary and undesirable. When the language of sec-
tion 9A(4) was first written into Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act in 1932, unions were weak. They asked for, and received, many
special legislative privileges and protections frankly designed to stim-
ulate their growth and provide a balance of power with large concen-
trations of capital. In the thirty years since 1932, unions have grown,
matured, and become powerful.
Furthermore, in 1932, when the language referring to reasonable
efforts to settle a dispute through negotiation, conciliation or arbi-
tration was written, there was no-legal duty on employers to recognize
or negotiate with unions or to respect the right of employees to organize
for the purposes of collective bargaining without interference or
discrimination. The employer's legal duties in these respects did not
arise until the Wagner Act of 1935. Thus, one can understand that
in 1932 legislators would feel that at least the employer should be
willing to sit down to discuss the labor dispute with the union before
seeking an injunction, particularly in view of the fact that in those
days what was so often sought to be enjoined was a peaceful strike
and peaceful picketing, claimed unlawful under the general doctrine
of a lack of justification for the union's objectives. All this has now
changed.
The combination of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Wagner
Act on the federal level resulted not only in a growth of union power,
but in many instances, abuses and excesses which were intolerable.
This, in turn, resulted in federal restrictions on labor in the Taft-
Hartley Act of 1947" and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959." But,
in Massachusetts, the legislature has not updated its labor laws to
63
 Note 7 supra.
54 Ibid.
55
 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin
Act) Act of Sept. 14, 1959, P.L. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified in scattered sections of
29 U.S.C.).
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provide a similar balance between the legitimate interests of unions
and employers. A minimum of protection to employers in any state
is the availability of prompt judicial relief against violence and mass
picketing.
Let us consider for a moment the broader question of whether it
is sound legal procedure to involve state court judges in the merits of
a labor dispute where the judicial relief sought is limited to the
maintenance of law and order. In the era prior to federal and state
anti-injunction acts, courts frequently granted injunctions even in
peaceful labor disputes on the grounds that the objective of the strike
was "not justified", In their successful drive to limit the use of
injunctions in labor disputes, unions vigorously contended that it was
unfair to leave the queston of whether there was justification for a
strike to the "economic predilections" of judges.
The pendulum has now swung completely the other way. Em-
ployers are now just as vigorously contending that they should not
be denied the protection of the laws to prevent mass picketing and
violence because of the opinions of judges that the company did not
have "sufficient reasons" for rejecting certain union proposals, or had
not exercised "good faith" in the course of negotiations, or failed
to make "every reasonable effort" to settle the labor dispute. The type
of judgment involved in reaching a conclusion on such issues obviously
entails controversial labor relations opinions which, under modern
jurisprudence, are generally regarded as unfamiliar to the experience
of judges who themselves claim no expertise in the field of labor
relations.
Rather, the national labor policy is to leave the obligations of
employers and unions with respect to their handling of labor relations
to an administrative agency, the National Labor Relations Board. It
is for that Board to determine whether a company has failed to bargain
collectively in good faith. The Board's province is confined to the
field of labor relations, and its remedies are available to unions if
they believe a company has committed unfair labor practices.
On the other hand, the maintenance of law and order, whether
connected with a labor dispute or not, is very much within the ex-
perience of the judges of the courts. But it is an unwarranted and
unfair burden to expect the court to become involved in the merits
of labor relations policies and procedures. The question is not whether
the opinions of the judges, as to what are reasonable efforts to settle
a dispute or what constitutes good faith bargaining, are right or wrong.
Nor does anyone question the sincerity of the judges' opinions. The
point is that the judges should not be called upon to express their
views as to the merits of labor relations issues in a case where the
sole issue raised by the plaintiff is whether there exists mass picketing
and violence.
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Suppose the tables were turned, and the question was whether
unions should be deprived of the right to strike and picket if the
judges of the courts should determine that the union had not made
every reasonable effort to settle the dispute, or was not justified in its
demands, or had failed to bargain in good faith. It is certain that
unions would make the very same argument against such a proposal,
namely, that the judges should not enter into the area of opinion
as to the policies and procedures followed by a party to a labor
dispute.
The most troublesome part of the section 9A(4) controversy is
the reference to arbitration. To deprive an employer of judicial relief
against mass picketing and violence because he exercises his right to
decline to arbitrate the union's demands on the terms of a new
contract is an unfair penalty and interferes with the concept of free
collective bargaining. The second opinion of the three judges in the
Bethlehem case appears to require only that the employer be willing
to consider a proposal for arbitration as distinguished from rejecting
it categorically. But the opinion of the three judges in the G.E.
case appears to imply that an employer is denied injunctive relief if
he merely fails to accept the union's proposal to arbitrate the terms
of the new agreement, even though such rejection is accompanied by
reasons.
Most employers are willing to arbitrate grievances arising under
an existing agreement and involving the interpretation and application
of the agreement or compliance with it. The typical collective
bargaining agreement spells out the grievance and arbitration pro-
cedure. This is voluntary arbitration by agreement of the parties.
Most employers are unwilling to arbitrate the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement itself—in other words, the issues
arising out of the union's demands which are subject to negotiation
between the parties. Many unions also decline to arbitrate their
contract demands. The reason for this distinction between arbitrating
contract grievances and contract terms is that the former involves
the resolution of disputes as to the interpretation of policies already
agreed to by the parties, whereas the latter places in the hands of
the arbitrator the power to determine what the policy will be. If
there were no grievance and arbitration clauses in the collective bar-
gaining agreement, disputes as to violation of the contract would have
to be resolved by court action or strikes. Thus, arbitration of con-
tract grievances provides stability through a less expensive, less time-
consuming and less formal method than court action. Furthermore,
there has developed a large body of arbitration rulings which is often
referred to as the common law of labor relations, so that the parties
and the arbitrator have some standards to go by. Typical of grievance
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arbitrations are discharge cases, application of overtime clauses, wage
rate changes when a method of operation changes, and lay off and
promotion cases under seniority clauses.
But arbitration of contract terms is something quite different.
Examples of such issues are whether the company should grant a ten
per cent wage increase, or grant the union shop, or provide a certain
type of seniority, or provide double time for certain hours of work,
or be able to change existing work rules (such as featherbedding prac-
tices). Here the arbitrator would have no agreement of the parties on
the policies—he would be making policy determinations for them.
It is not unlawful for either a company or a union to refuse
to arbitrate contract terms. In fact, one of the principles on which
organized businessmen and organized labor are agreed is their joint
opposition to compulsory arbitration. Thus, it is unfair for the law
to deprive an employer of his right to judicial relief against mass
picketing and violence, because he chooses not to arbitrate contract
terms. Such a state of the law places an unwarranted penalty on one
party to a labor dispute for exercising his legal right to decline the
placing of contract policy in the hands of a third party for final
determination.
Furthermore, section 9A(4), which had its genesis in the 1932
federal statute, and as interpreted by the three judge panels, is today
contrary to the concept of free collective bargaining established as
national labor policy in 1935. Inherent in the concept of collective bar-
gaining is the risk of economic sanctions if there is a failure to agree.
These economic sanctions—the withdrawal of labor from working
and the effects of a peaceful picket line on the employer's business,
along with the effect of the workers' loss of pay—follow when the
parties reach an impasse, that is, fail to agree after negotiations, and
the employees exercise their rights to strike and to engage in peace-
ful picketing, subject to the risk of their being replaced by a non-
striker.
But, when the employees go further and engage in mass picketing
and violence, they have gone beyond economic warfare and into
the arena of physical combat. Collective bargaining has then been sub-
verted to dictation by physical force and violence. Collective bar-
gaining is then no longer an interplay of relative economic strength.
And, if the employer must surrender to a demand of the union for
arbitration of contract terms as the price for restraining mass
picketing and violence, the process of collective bargaining becomes
one of compulsion rather than an exercise of the freedom to agree
or disagree, after negotiations, with resolution of an impasse deter-
minable by economic sanctions. Either party is entirely free to propose
arbitration and it may be deemed a suitable method of resolving the
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dispute by the other party. If so, it is truly voluntary arbitration.
But arbitration of contract terms partakes of the character of com-
pulsory arbitration when to decline it involves deprivation of the use
of one's property by physical force without the right to judicial relief
to restrain such force. And such a statutory interpretation is an
encouragement for a union to strike, since the risk of job loss through
replacements, otherwise inherent in any strike situation is minimized
by the knowledge the union can resort to force and mass picketing
with impunity if it but first proposes arbitration.
In some quarters it has been suggested, in defense of section
9A(4), as interpreted by the three judge panels in Massachusetts,
that it is based upon the application of the equity principle of "clean
hands". This contention is untenable, at least so far as any obligation
to arbitrate the labor dispute is concerned."
First, under this doctrine the plaintiff's lack of clean hands refers
to his having engaged in some wrongful, unlawful or unconscionable
conduct. But the declination to arbitrate is not an illegal or un-
conscionable act.
Secondly, the doctrine of "clean hands" requires a connection
between the plaintiff's illegal acts and the defendant's conduct which
is complained of. Thus, the declination to arbitrate has no connection
with the union's use of mass picketing and violence to obtain its
contract demands. It is still free to strike and picket peacefully for
its demands if the employer declines arbitration. If an employer were
physically to attack peaceful pickets, there would of course be a
connection between such conduct and subsequent violence by the
pickets. But, just because the union thinks the employer is a "bad"
employer because it declines to arbitrate, this is no provocation for us-
ing force and violence. Equity does not deny relief "because of the
general iniquitous conduct on the part of the complainant."" Thus,
mass picketing and violence should be restrained regardless of anyone's
opinion as to whether the particular employer and his labor relations
policies are good, bad, or indifferent.
Thirdly, the doctrine of "clean hands" as a general principle of
equity is still available to a court as a matter of discretion in any
particular case, whether there is a section 9A(4) provision or not.
Fourthly, the argument of those who contend that the "clean
hands" doctrine is applicable here, is merely another way of stating
the discredited doctrine that the end justifies the means. For, if, as
56 Both employers and unions are aware that if, during a strike, the employer
seeks to hire replacements for the strikers, the bitterness of the dispute is increased.
But the employer's legal right to hire permanent replacements for strikers where the
strike is an economic one and not an unfair labor practice strike, has long been recog-
nized. NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
57 19 Am. Jur. Equity § 473 (1939).
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generally admitted, mass picketing and violence are illegal means for
carrying on a labor dispute, they should not be legally permitted on
the grounds that, in someone's opinion, the labor relations policies of
a particular employer are sufficiently bad to warrant use of the illegal
means.
In retrospect, therefore, we come down to a few basic principles.
The maintenance of law and order during a labor dispute is a primary
responsibility of the several states, first through local police action
and, failing this, injunctive relief restraining mass picketing and
violence. On the other hand, the employer's conduct in respect to
the handling of the labor dispute itself is, under national labor policy,
an exclusive matter for the National Labor Relations Board for those
companies subject to its jurisdiction. Since Section 9A(4) of the
Massachusetts Anti-Injunction Act as interpreted by the lower
Massachusetts courts effectively nullifies these principles, the section
should be amended to permit the operation of these principles, or the
courts should, on pre-emption grounds, rule the section inapplicable to
employers whose operations affect interstate commerce.
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